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ACCOMMODATING PREGNANCY FIVE YEARS AFTER 
YOUNG V. UPS: WHERE WE ARE & WHERE WE SHOULD GO 
NICOLE BUONOCORE PORTER* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article will explore how pregnant employees fare when they are denied 
accommodations in the workplace that would have allowed them to work safely 
through their pregnancies. The two most commonly used legal avenues for 
pregnant plaintiffs are the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Successful cases under the ADA were 
rare until Congress expanded the ADA’s definition of disability in 2008. PDA 
claims became easier after the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Young v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc. This Article will analyze both the body of PDA cases 
decided since Young, and all of the ADA cases where pregnancy is the claimed 
disability since the ADA was amended in 2008. Although the picture isn’t quite 
rosy for pregnant plaintiffs, it is perhaps more positive than many scholars 
predicted it would be. Nevertheless, there remain many gaps in protection—
some caused by the statutes’ limitations—but many caused by litigants’ and 
judges’ inability (or unwillingness) to properly interpret these two statutes. This 
Article will explain where we are and explore options for where we should go in 
the future.  
  
 
* Nicole Buonocore Porter, Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. This Article 
was written as part of a symposium that was to be hosted by Saint Louis University School of Law 
and the Journal. Although the in-person meeting was cancelled because of COVID-19, I appreciate 
the opportunity to discuss these important issues in written format. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Although many (if not most) pregnancies proceed without complications, 
many pregnant women will need some modifications to their jobs when they are 
pregnant,1 especially if their jobs are physically rigorous. These modifications 
(often called “accommodations”) might be as simple as taking extra breaks2 to 
drink water,3 sit down to rest, or use the restroom; sitting on a stool instead of 
standing for an entire shift;4 or a bit more complicated, such as a waiver from 
all heavy lifting. But employers often refuse to provide accommodations for 
pregnancy, leaving pregnant employees performing tasks that are detrimental to 
the health and well-being of their pregnancies5 or being forced to take leave 
(often unpaid) when they could be working with minor adjustments to their jobs. 
Employers’ refusal to provide accommodations for pregnancy falls more harshly 
on women in low-income jobs6 and on women in historically male professions 
like firefighting, construction work, and law enforcement.7 Many of these 
women lose their jobs because of their employers’ refusal to accommodate the 
limitations caused by their pregnancies.8 In addition to the hardship borne by 
these women and their families, the failure of employers to accommodate their 
pregnant employees “indirectly contributes to occupational sex segregation by 
discouraging other women from pursuing jobs that they risk losing when they 
 
 1. Thelma L. Harmon, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.: The Equal Treatment Fallacy, 
20 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 97, 106 (2017) (noting that 71% of pregnant workers need more 
breaks; 61% need schedule changes; 53% need a change in job duties to allow more sitting or less 
lifting; 40% need other types of workplace adjustments). 
 2. See, for example, Colas v. City Univ. N.Y., 17-CV-4825 (NGG) (JO), 2019 WL 2028701, 
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2019), where the plaintiff was harassed for taking restroom breaks and 
having to sit down. She eventually quit, claiming constructive discharge. Id. at *2. 
 3. See Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08–1244–EFM, 2009 WL 1617669, at *1 (D. 
Kan. June 9, 2009), where a pregnant employee lost her job because drinking water while working 
violated store policy. 
 4. See Stephanie A. Pisko, Towards Reasonable: The Rise of State Pregnancy 
Accommodation Laws, 23 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147, 153 (2016) (giving the example of a bank 
teller whose pregnancy caused swollen feet and high blood pressure, so her doctor recommended 
that she sit on a stool). 
 5. See, for example, Thomas v. Fla. Pars. Juv. Just. Comm’n, No. 18-2921, 2019 WL 
118011, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 7, 2019), where the plaintiff was refused a waiver from completing a 
1.5-mile run test while she was pregnant. Attempting the run led to her experiencing severe pain 
and having to be transported to the emergency room. Id. at *2–3. See also Harmon, supra note 2, 
at 106 (stating that many women never ask for the accommodations they need). 
 6. Pisko, supra note 5, at 154 (stating that a narrow reading of the PDA has had negative 
consequences for low-income women, who need to continue to work during their pregnancies and 
cannot afford to take leave). 
 7. Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as “Disability” and the Amended Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 53 B.C. L. REV. 443, 454 (2012). 
 8. Id. 
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become pregnant.”9 If a pregnant employee wants to challenge these actions, the 
two most common legal avenues are the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA)10 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).11 
Although claims under both of these statutes were rarely successful,12 two 
legal developments have contributed to their increased success. First, the ADA 
was amended in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009) to dramatically expand the 
definition of disability.13 And second, in 2015, the Supreme Court decided a 
case, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,14 that made it easier for pregnant 
employees to seek accommodations under the PDA. We are now five years past 
that decision in Young. Thus, this is a good time to see where we are and to 
attempt to draw some conclusions about where we should be. 
Specifically, this Article will analyze the body of cases decided since the 
Young v. UPS decision, and all of the ADA cases where pregnancy is the claimed 
disability since the ADA was amended in 2008. Although the picture is not quite 
rosy for pregnant plaintiffs, it is perhaps more positive than many scholars 
predicted it would be. Nevertheless, there remain many gaps in protection—
some caused by the statutes’ limitations—but many caused by litigants’ and 
judges’ inability (or unwillingness) to properly interpret these two statutes. This 
Article will explain where we are and explore options for where we should go 
in the future. 
This Article proceeds in four additional parts. Part II will provide a brief 
history of pregnancy discrimination and accommodation protections, 
proceeding chronologically from the passage of the PDA in 1978, through the 
passage of the ADA in 1990 and the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) in 2008, 
and finally, to the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Young v. UPS. Part III will 
discuss all of the cases decided under the PDA since Young, as well as the ADA 
cases discussing pregnancy as a disability. Finally, Part IV will attempt to draw 
some conclusions from the cases discussed in Part III, and, perhaps more 
importantly, will provide some advice for how these protections might be more 
successful in the future for assisting pregnant women in receiving the 
accommodations they need in the workplace. Part V will briefly conclude.  
 
 9. Id. 
 10. The ADA requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations to individuals with 
disabilities as long as those accommodations do not cause an undue hardship. 42 U.S.C. § 
12112(b)(5)(A). 
 11. As will be discussed below, the PDA requires employers to treat pregnant women the same 
as other workers who are similar in their ability or inability to work. Thus, courts have sometimes 
treated the PDA as requiring employers to provide some accommodations to pregnant workers. 
This is discussed in more detail infra Parts II.A, C. 
 12. John C. Williams et al., A Sip of Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodation After the ADA 
Amendments Act, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 111 (2013). 
 13. Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans With Disabilities Act: 
Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 218 (2008). 
 14. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206 (2015). 
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II.  CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS 
A. Enactment and Early Days of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
The PDA was passed in 1978, as an amendment to Title VII.15 It was a 
reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gilbert v. General Electric Co.,16 in 
which the Court held that an employer’s otherwise comprehensive temporary 
disability policy that excluded pregnancy was not sex discrimination under Title 
VII.17 The Court reasoned that because not all women are or will become 
pregnant, and because the employer’s policy at issue did not discriminate against 
all women, pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimination.18 
Congress disagreed and passed the PDA19 in 1978. The PDA amends the 
definition of “sex” under Title VII and has two clauses.20 The first clause makes 
explicit that discrimination based on sex includes discrimination because of 
“pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”21 So a refusal to hire a 
pregnant woman because she is pregnant would be unlawful sex discrimination 
under Title VII. But the second clause does more—it provides that “women 
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated 
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits 
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in 
their ability or inability to work.”22 
After the PDA was passed, courts differed regarding how to interpret the 
PDA’s second clause.23 Some courts held that employer policies that were 
“pregnancy blind,” such as policies that reserved light duty positions for 
employees with workplace injuries, did not violate the PDA.24 In other words, 
employees who had been given accommodations (often “light duty”) because of 
 
 15. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076. 
 16. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
 17. Id. at 145–46. 
 18. Id. at 136. 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See generally Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, A Special Delivery: Litigating Pregnancy 
Accommodation Claims after the Supreme Court Decision in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 
68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 683, 684–86 (2016) (discussing courts’ different approaches). 
 24. Deborah A. Widiss, The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act After Young v. UPS, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1423, 1428 (2017); 
Zehrt, supra note 24, at 685 (listing the 4th, 5th, 7th, and 11th Circuits as narrowly interpreting the 
second clause; if the employer only offers light duty to those with occupational injuries, they do 
not need to offer it to pregnant workers). But see id. (stating that the 6th, 8th, and 10th Circuits 
interpreted the PDA more broadly, comparing the relative abilities of pregnant and non-pregnant 
workers, rather than the source of injury). 
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some “neutral” policy were not appropriate comparators.25 As one scholar 
pointed out, courts often insisted on finding animus against pregnancy before 
allowing the plaintiff’s PDA claim; as long as the reason for the accommodation 
given to other employees was an external source (such as workers’ 
compensation laws, the ADA, or a collective bargaining agreement), this 
sufficed as a valid reason to treat pregnant women worse than other employees.26 
Many scholars became critical of the PDA, arguing that it could not address the 
fact that “pregnant women are ready and able to work, but require some level of 
accommodation to maintain their health while performing their job duties at an 
adequate level.”27 
B. Pregnancy as a Disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
1. Original ADA 
The ADA was passed in 1990 with overwhelming support.28 But it was not 
too long before the federal courts, especially the Supreme Court, began narrowly 
interpreting the definition of disability.29 Under the ADA, a disability is defined 
as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major 
life activities, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such 
an impairment.30 Through a series of four Supreme Court decisions,31 and 
 
 25. Using comparators is one of the most common ways of proving discrimination. For 
instance, imagine an employer with two employees that perform the exact same job (e.g., cashier 
in a grocery store). One is pregnant and the other is not. If the employer allowed the non-pregnant 
cashier to take frequent breaks to smoke cigarettes, but refused to let the pregnant worker take 
frequent breaks to use the restroom or drink water, the pregnant worker could point to the non-
pregnant worker as a comparator to establish that the employer’s refusal to let her take the breaks 
was discrimination based on her pregnancy. 
 26. Deborah L. Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment Discrimination: From Unjustified 
Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 GEO. L.J. 559, 580 (2017) [hereinafter 
Shifting Sands]; Deborah L. Brake, On Not “Having It Both Ways” and Still Losing: Reflections 
on Fifty Years of Pregnancy Litigation Under Title VII, 95 B.U. L. REV. 995, 1001 (2015). 
 27. See, e.g., Sheerine Alemzadeh, Claiming Disability, Reclaiming Pregnancy: A Critical 
Analysis of the ADA’s Pregnancy Exclusion, 27 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 1, 8 (2012). 
 28. See Long, supra note 14, at 217 (stating that the expectations for the original ADA had 
been very high). 
 29. See Michelle A. Travis, Impairment as Protected Status: A New Universality for Disability 
Rights, 46 GA. L. REV. 937, 938 (2012) (stating that Congress enacted the ADAAA to overturn a 
set of United States Supreme Court decisions that narrowly interpreted the definition of disability). 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). 
 31. The first three decisions (called the “Sutton trilogy”) held that, when determining if 
someone has a disability, that person’s impairment should be considered in its mitigated state—
i.e., with any medication or assistive devices that ameliorate the effect of the person’s impairment. 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1999) (holding that fully correctable 
myopia is not a disability using the just-announced mitigating measures rule); Murphy v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (holding that the plaintiff’s hypertension, which was 
lowered with medication, was not a disability); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 
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hundreds of lower-court decisions, conditions such as diabetes, cancer, AIDS, 
bipolar disorder, multiple sclerosis, monocular vision, epilepsy, cerebral palsy, 
and intellectual disabilities were all found not to be disabilities under the original 
ADA.32 Scholars referred to the courts as having engaged in a “backlash” against 
the ADA.33 In fact, one study demonstrated that employers had prevailed in 
ninety-two percent of ADA cases filed in court.34 
Thus, it should not be surprising that, under the original ADA, courts did not 
often consider pregnancy to be a disability.35 In fact, as stated by one scholar, 
before the ADAAA was passed, courts routinely denied ADA coverage to 
pregnant women who experienced limitations during pregnancy, such as severe 
headaches, dizziness, vomiting, extreme fatigue, and the need to curtail heavy 
lifting and exposure to hazardous chemicals.36 Courts thought that pregnancy 
was “normal”37 and, if anything, represented heightened rather than diminished 
biological functioning.38 Moreover, the Toyota Court’s “long-term or 
permanent” requirement to establishing a covered disability made it almost 
impossible for courts to see pregnancy (which is, inevitably, not permanent or 
long-term) as a disability.39 And most scholars were not advocating for the ADA 
to cover pregnancy as a disability because they were worried that providing 
 
565–66 (1999) (holding that the plaintiff’s monocular vision was not a per se disability and the 
court on remand should consider whether the plaintiff’s brain’s ability to cope with his monocular 
vision renders it not substantially limiting). The fourth decision clarified the correct meaning of 
“substantially limits” and “major life activities.” See Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 
197–98 (2002). The Court held that the ADA only applies to major life activities that are of “central 
importance to most people’s daily lives.” Id. at 197. In defining “substantially limits” in the 
definition of disability, the Court stated: “We therefore hold that to be substantially limited in 
performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts 
the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives. The 
impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long term.” Id. at 198. 
 32. Nicole Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2014). 
 33. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LABOR L. 19, 22 (2006); SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, DISABLING 
INTERPRETATIONS: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN FEDERAL COURT 48–58 (2005). 
 34. RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT 79 (2005). See also Williams et al., supra note 13, at 111 (stating that by 
2006, defendants were winning ninety-seven percent of all ADA cases resolved in court). 
 35. See Alemzadeh, supra note 28, at 6 (citing to several cases pre-ADAAA where courts held 
that pregnancy is not a disability). 
 36. Cox, supra note 8, at 446–47. 
 37. Alemzadeh, supra note 28, at 9–10 (stating that courts often engaged in the effort of trying 
to distinguish normal from abnormal pregnancies). 
 38. Cox, supra note 8, at 447. 
 39. Alemzadeh, supra note 28, at 10. 
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pregnancy coverage under the ADA would reinstate outdated views that 
women’s physical differences are deficiencies.40  
2. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
Because Congress was unhappy with the narrowed definition of disability, 
it passed the ADAAA, which went into effect on January 1, 2009.41 The 
ADAAA did not change the basic definition of disability.42 Instead, it included 
several rules of construction to assist courts in interpreting the definition of 
disability in conformity with the broad definition Congress envisioned.43 
Most relevant to this Article, the ADAAA’s main changes included: 
overruling the “mitigating measures” rule announced in the Sutton trilogy of 
cases,44 disagreeing with the Toyota Court’s stringent definition of 
“substantially limits”,45 and broadening the definition of “major life 
activities.”46 With regard to the expansion of the definition of major life 
activities, the inclusion of work-related tasks like standing, lifting, and bending 
can help pregnant women because restrictions on such activities are common 
during pregnancy.47 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
issued regulations implementing the ADAAA, which became effective on May 
24, 2011.48 The regulations accomplished several things; the one most relevant 
 
 40. Cox, supra note 8, at 448. See also Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 
91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 1076–77 (2015) (noting that many believed that women’s status would 
be demeaned by comparing pregnancy to disability). 
 41. Long, supra note 14, at 217. 
 42. Id. at 218. 
 43. Porter, supra note 33, at 15. 
 44. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i) (stating that the determination of whether an impairment 
substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of 
mitigating measures such as: medication, medical supplies, hearing aids, assistive technology, etc.). 
 45. See id. §§ 12102(4)(A), (B) (stating that the definition of disability shall be construed in 
favor of broad coverage, but ultimately punting on the definition of “substantially limits” and 
instead deferring to the EEOC to define the phrase). See also Williams et al., supra note 13, at 115 
(stating that the ADAAA eases the burden on plaintiffs proving that their major life activities were 
substantially limited). 
 46. Prior to the ADAAA, the statute itself did not define major life activities; instead, the 
EEOC had provided a fairly narrow definition. The ADAAA defines major life activities in the 
statute itself to include: “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, 
sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, 
thinking, communicating and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). It also states that major life 
activities include “the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions 
of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, 
respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.” Id. § 12102(2)(B). 
 47. Cox, supra note 8, at 461. 
 48. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With 
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 58, 16978 (Mar. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1630). 
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to pregnancy is that the regulations state: “The effects of an impairment lasting 
or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting within the 
meaning of this section.”49 
Below, I will discuss the post-ADAAA cases considering whether 
pregnancy constitutes a disability.50 As for the literature on pregnancy as a 
disability, scholars are divided on whether they believe that pregnancy should 
be a disability.51 But a lengthy discussion of the theoretical arguments for and 
against classifying pregnancy as a disability is beyond the scope of this Article.  
C. 2015: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Young v. UPS 
The landscape of pregnancy accommodations changed when the Supreme 
Court decided Young v. UPS.52 The plaintiff, Peggy Young, was a part-time 
driver for UPS, where her duties included pickup and delivery of packages that 
had arrived by air the prior night.53 After several miscarriages, she finally 
became pregnant in 2006.54 Because of her history of miscarriages, her doctor 
advised her to avoid lifting more than twenty pounds during the first twenty 
weeks of her pregnancy and more than ten pounds thereafter.55 Because UPS 
required drivers to be able to lift parcels weighing up to seventy pounds, UPS 
told Young that she could not work with her lifting restriction.56 Accordingly, 
she was placed on unpaid leave most of her pregnancy and eventually lost her 
medical coverage.57 
Young brought a lawsuit under the PDA, arguing that UPS accommodated 
other drivers who were similar in their ability or inability to work.58 In doing so, 
she pointed to several classes of individuals who were accommodated by UPS, 
which included (1) those with workplace injuries, (2) those who had disabilities 
as defined by the ADA, and (3) those who lost their Department of 
 
 49. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2019). See also Cox, supra note 8, at 462–63 (discussing the 
importance of the relaxing of the durational requirements); Williams et al., supra note 13, at 114. 
 50. See infra Part III.A. 
 51. Compare Alemzadeh, supra note 28, at 1, 16 (arguing in favor of pregnancy being 
considered a disability), Cox, supra note 8 (same), and Harmon, supra note 2, at 138 (stating that 
pregnancy should be viewed as a variation of a disability and not an anomaly), with Bradley A. 
Areheart, Accommodating Pregnancy, 67 ALA. L. REV. 1125, 1163–66 (2016) (discussing the 
problems associated with classifying pregnancy as a disability). 
 52. 575 U.S. 206 (2015). 
 53. Id. at 211. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Young, 575 U.S. at 211. 
 58. Id. 
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Transportation (DOT) certifications.59 After discovery, UPS filed a motion for 
summary judgment, and the district court granted it, concluding that UPS offered 
a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for not accommodating Young—because 
she did not fall into any of the pregnancy-blind categories of employees for 
which UPS provides accommodations.60 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, stating 
that Young’s comparators (all three classes of employees who were 
accommodated according to UPS’s policies) were not “similarly situated” to 
Young because their limitations were caused by reasons other than pregnancy.61 
Young petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the case, and the Court granted 
certiorari. 
The Court recognized that the parties had very different interpretations of 
the second clause of the PDA.62 The plaintiff argued that whenever an employer 
accommodates a subset of workers with disabling conditions, a PDA violation 
exists if pregnant workers who are similar in their ability or inability to work do 
not receive the same accommodation.63 UPS argued that the second clause does 
no more than “define sex discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination.”64 
The Court rejected both of these views. The Court said that Young’s 
approach would grant pregnant women “most-favored-nation” status; as long as 
an employer provides any employee with an accommodation (such as someone 
who has been with the company for a long time or who works in a particularly 
hazardous job), the employer would have to give pregnant workers the same 
accommodation.65 The Court did not believe that Young’s approach was 
consistent with Congress’s intent when passing the PDA.66 The second clause 
of the PDA uses the open-ended term “other persons”; it does not say that the 
employer must treat pregnant employees the same as “any other persons.”67 The 
Court also disagreed with UPS’s interpretation that the second clause simply 
defines sex discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination.68 The Court 
noted that the first clause accomplished this objective when it expressly 
amended Title VII to define “because of sex” to include because of pregnancy.69 
Moreover, UPS’s interpretation would fail to carry out Congress’s clear intent 
 
 59. Id. at 211–12. One of the reasons that a driver might lose DOT certification is if they were 
convicted for drunk driving. See id. at 217. In other words, drunk drivers were accommodated but 
pregnant women were not. 
 60. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. DKC 08–2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *17, *22 (D. 
Md. Feb. 14, 2011). 
 61. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 450 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 62. Young, 575 U.S. at 219. 
 63. Id. at 220. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 221. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Young, 575 U.S. at 222. 
 68. Id. at 226. 
 69. Id. 
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to overturn both the holding and reasoning of the Gilbert decision.70 Simply 
including pregnancy among Title VII’s protected traits would not respond to the 
Gilbert Court’s determination that an employer can treat pregnancy less 
favorably than diseases or disabilities resulting in a similar inability to work.71 
The second clause was intended to do more than simply overturn Gilbert’s 
reasoning that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination. It was also 
intended to overrule the holding in Gilbert and illustrate how discrimination 
against pregnancy is to be remedied.72 
Accordingly, the Court started with the McDonnell Douglas framework, 
which is how most disparate treatment cases are analyzed.73 The Court noted 
that the first step in the analysis, the plaintiff’s prima facie case, is not intended 
to be an onerous burden, and it should not require the plaintiff to show that those 
whom the employer favored and disfavored were similar in all but the protected 
ways.74 Thus the plaintiff alleging that a denial of an accommodation constituted 
disparate treatment under the PDA’s second clause may demonstrate a prima 
facie case by showing that: (1) she belongs to the protected class; (2) she sought 
accommodation; (3) the employer did not accommodate her; and (4) the 
employer did accommodate others “similar in their ability or inability to 
work.”75 The burden would then shift to the employer to justify its refusal to 
accommodate the plaintiff by relying on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons 
for denying her the accommodation.76 But (and this is key), the reason “normally 
cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to 
add pregnant women to the category of those (‘similar in their ability or inability 
to work’) whom the employer accommodates. After all, the employer in Gilbert 
could . . . have made such a claim.”77 It is not entirely clear what reasons the 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Young, 575 U.S. at 228. 
 73. Id. at 210–13. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) is a famous Title 
VII race discrimination case that set out the burden-shifting framework for intentional 
discrimination cases under Title VII. The plaintiff claimed a discriminatory failure to hire. The 
Court stated that the plaintiff first bears the burden of proof to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination, which includes four elements: (1) that he belongs to a protected class; (2) that he 
applied for and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that 
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) that after his rejection, the position remained 
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of the plaintiff’s qualifications. 
Id. at 802. Because most cases are not failure-to-hire cases, courts have modified the prima facie 
case accordingly. Assuming the plaintiff can meet the prima facie case, the employer then has the 
burden to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the decision. Assuming that burden 
is met, the plaintiff has the opportunity to prove that the employer’s articulated reasons were not 
the real reasons for the decision but were instead a pretext for discrimination. Id. 
 74. Young, 575 U.S. at 228. 
 75. Id. at 229. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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Court thought would suffice for this stage of the analysis, but some 
commentators have argued that the Court suggested that permissible reasons 
might include things like age, seniority, job classifications, or job 
requirements.78 
The burden then shifts to the employee to show that the employer’s proffered 
reasons are in fact pretextual.79 And this is where the Court’s decision gets a 
little strange. The Court stated: 
We believe that the plaintiff may reach a jury on this issue by providing 
sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on 
pregnant workers, and that the employer’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” 
reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather—when 
considered along with the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of 
intentional discrimination.80 
As to the “significant burden” the Court mentioned, the Court stated that the 
plaintiff can create a genuine issue of material fact by “providing evidence that 
the employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while 
failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers.”81 Using the 
facts of the instant case, the Court suggested that the plaintiff could show that 
UPS accommodated most nonpregnant employees with lifting limitations while 
categorically refusing to accommodate most pregnant employees with lifting 
limitations.82 She might also point to the fact that UPS had multiple policies that 
accommodate nonpregnant employees with lifting restrictions and that this 
suggests that “its reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees with 
lifting restrictions are not sufficiently strong—to the point that a jury could find 
that its reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees give rise to an 
inference of intentional discrimination.”83 
Accordingly, the Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment, stating that 
“there is a genuine dispute as to whether UPS provided more favorable treatment 
to at least some employees whose situation cannot reasonably be distinguished 
from Young’s.”84 This provided the proof needed for the fourth element of the 
prima facie case.85 Young also introduced evidence that UPS had three separate 
accommodation policies that, taken together, significantly burdened pregnant 
women.86 The Fourth Circuit did not consider the combined effects of these 
 
 78. Zehrt, supra note 24, at 702. 
 79. Young, 575 U.S. at 229. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 229–30. 
 82. Id. at 230. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Young, 575 U.S. at 231. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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policies, nor did it consider the strength of UPS’s justifications for its policies.87 
As the Court stated, “[W]hy, when the employer accommodated so many, could 
it not accommodate pregnant women as well?”88 
Scholars had mixed reactions to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Young. 
Most commentators agreed that the Court’s decision deviated from normal 
disparate treatment law, especially at the pretext stage.89 But almost all scholars 
recognized that the case was a positive step in the right direction for 
accommodating pregnant women.90 At the same time, many hoped that the 
Court would have gone further and held that the PDA required accommodations 
for pregnancy as long as any other employee had been accommodated or would 
be accommodated if they were similar in their ability or inability to work.91  
III.  WHERE WE ARE 
This Part will first discuss the ADA cases where pregnant plaintiffs sought 
accommodations. It will then discuss the cases brought under the PDA since the 
decision in Young. Because the ADA was amended in 2008, effective January 
1, 2009, the ADA cases go back to the effective date of the ADAAA, whereas 
the PDA cases are limited to the period after Young v. UPS was decided in 2015.  
A. ADA Pregnancy Accommodation Cases 
As mentioned above, prior to the ADAAA, bringing an ADA claim based 
on pregnancy was very difficult. The definition of disability was interpreted very 
narrowly, and pregnancy was seen as a natural function of women’s bodies that, 
at most, had only short-term effects on women’s ability to go about their daily 
activities. However, the ADAAA’s expanded definition has allowed for more 
pregnant women to claim a covered disability. In the cases I discovered where 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. Ultimately the court remanded to the Fourth Circuit to determine whether Young 
created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether UPS’s reasons for treating Young less 
favorably than other nonpregnant employees were pretextual. Young, 575 U.S. at 232. 
 89. See, e.g., Shifting Sands, supra note 27, at 584–85; Widiss, supra note 25, at 1433 
(describing the opinion as “unusual”); Zehrt, supra note 24, at 687 (stating that the case “further 
complicates pregnancy accommodation decisions, leaving many unanswered questions for lower 
federal courts to resolve in future cases.”). 
 90. See, e.g., Shifting Sands, supra note 27, at 590; Widiss, supra note 25, at 1433 (agreeing 
with the decision and stating it makes “practical sense”). 
 91. See, e.g., Areheart, supra note 52, at 1138 (“[T]he holding is still a far cry from what 
Young and most amici sought: a guaranteed right to pregnancy accommodations. Unless Congress 
now chooses to amend the PDA, it appears the Supreme Court has closed the door on the statute’s 
possible guarantee of accommodation rights.”); Widiss, supra note 25, at 1425–26 (stating that the 
Court in Young stopped short of endorsing the argument that intent was irrelevant as long as the 
plaintiff could show other workers received more favorable treatment); Zehrt, supra note 24, at 705 
(stating that the Young decision leaves many open questions and Congress should intervene and 
amend the PDA to provide pregnant workers a clear, affirmative right of accommodation). 
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the alleged disability was pregnancy, courts allowed the plaintiff’s ADA claim 
to survive in seventeen of them and dismissed the plaintiff’s ADA claim (on the 
coverage question) in seven of them.  
1. Pregnancy Is a Disability 
As discussed earlier, the definition of disability is a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. Plaintiffs prove a 
covered disability by establishing that (1) they have an impairment; (2) the 
impairment affects a major life activity; and (3) the impairment substantially 
limits the major life activity. The cases that discuss pregnancy as a disability 
address one or more of these three steps to proving disability. 
a. Pregnancy as an Impairment 
The EEOC used to have a so-called pregnancy exclusion, stating that 
pregnancy is ordinarily not an impairment.92 Although that language still exists, 
the regulations also state: “[A] pregnancy-related impairment that substantially 
limits a major life activity is a disability under the first prong of the definition.”93 
Some post-ADAAA courts are willing to recognize pregnancy as an impairment 
as long as there are complications arising from or restrictions because of the 
pregnancy. Thus, for instance, in Mayorga v. Alorica, Inc.,94 the plaintiff was a 
customer service representative who had a high-risk pregnancy.95 Her 
complications included premature contractions; irritation of the uterus; severe 
pelvic, back, and lower abdominal pain; headaches; and other pregnancy-related 
conditions.96 At one point she was put on bed rest for three weeks.97 Upon 
returning from three weeks of leave, she was terminated, with one of her 
supervisors stating: “Sorry. I cannot accommodate you. This is a company. We 
need you here. So, since you can’t be here because you are pregnant, we cannot 
accommodate you.”98 She brought both an ADA claim and a PDA claim, but the 
employer only moved to dismiss the ADA claim. The court held that the ADA 
claim survived the employer’s motion to dismiss.99 The court noted that 
pregnancy-related impairments can constitute a disability if they substantially 
 
 92. Fact Sheet for Small Businesses: Pregnancy Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (June 14, 2014), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/fact-sheet-small-
businesses-pregnancy-discrimination. 
 93. 34 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (2019). 
 94. No. 12–21578–CIV., 2012 WL 3043021 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2012). 
 95. Id. at *1. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. Although her employer initially denied her leave request stating, “I am not going to 
treat you special because you are pregnant,” subsequently, her leave was approved. Id. 
 98. Mayorga, 2012 WL 3043021, at *1. 
 99. Id. at *2–3. 
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limit a major life activity.100 “Thus, where a medical condition arises out of a 
pregnancy and causes an impairment separate from the symptoms associated 
with a healthy pregnancy, or significantly intensifies the symptoms associated 
with a healthy pregnancy, such medical condition may fall within the ADA’s 
definition of a disability.”101 Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff had 
pleaded sufficient facts to survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss.102 
Similarly, in Colas v. City of University of New York,103 the court noted that 
the plaintiff’s pregnancy-related symptoms, which included “periodic leg 
muscle spasms, neck pain, fatigue and shortness of breath, episodes of cramping 
and contractions, ligament pain, back pain, [ ] joint pain, nausea and 
headaches,”104 could be considered a disability.105  
b. Major Life Activities 
One of the primary reasons that pregnant plaintiffs are able to establish 
disabilities more readily after the ADAAA is because the Amendments 
specifically include “lifting” as a major life activity, and many pregnant women 
are on doctors’ orders to avoid heavy lifting. For instance, in Heatherly v. 
Portillo’s Hot Dogs, Inc.,106 the plaintiff’s pregnancy was high risk so her doctor 
ordered her to avoid working more than six to eight hours per day and to avoid 
heavy lifting.107 Although the court did not discuss the hour restriction, it did 
hold that her restriction on lifting was enough to establish that her pregnancy 
could be considered a disability.108 
Similarly, in Bray v. Town of Wake Forest,109 the plaintiff was a police 
officer who was still a probationary employee when she discovered that she was 
pregnant.110 She submitted a doctor’s note requesting that she be placed on light 
duty.111 The employer refused because it reserved light duty for those who 
suffered from workplace injuries and terminated the plaintiff.112 The plaintiff’s 
complaint alleged that she was substantially limited in lifting, bending, running, 
 
 100. Id. at *4. 
 101. Id. at *5. 
 102. Id. at *6. 
 103. 17-CV-4825 (NGG) (JO), 2019 WL 2028701 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2019). 
 104. Id. at *1. 
 105. Id. at *3 (stating that pregnancy related impairments may qualify as ADA disabilities if 
they substantially limit a major life activity). 
 106. 958 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 107. Id. at 920. 
 108. Id. at 921. Note, however, that her accommodation claim was denied because the court 
held that the employer did in fact accommodate her. Id. at 922. 
 109. No. 5:14–CV–276–FL., 2015 WL 1534515 (E.D. N.C. Apr. 6, 2015). 
 110. Id. at *1. 
 111. Id. at *2. 
 112. Id. at *3. 
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and jumping.113 Citing to all the correct post-ADAAA law,114 the court noted 
that the plaintiff had three doctors’ notes stating that she could not lift more than 
twenty pounds, run, jump or have physical altercations; this was sufficient to 
establish that she had a disability.115 
A similar fact scenario was present in Colas v. City of University of New 
York.116 There the court held that there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
that the plaintiff’s pregnancy-related complications substantially limited her in 
bending and lifting.117 And in Varone v. Great Wolf Lodge of the Poconos, 
LLC,118 the plaintiff worked as a massage therapist when she became pregnant. 
Her doctor requested that she have ten-minute breaks in between the 
massages.119 The defendant failed to accommodate her, which led to her lawsuit. 
In response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court noted that the plaintiff 
had alleged that she could not stand for long periods of time and that her 
pregnancy caused pain and cramping in her legs and stomach.120 She argued she 
was limited in the major life activity of lifting (along with other major life 
activities).121 The court held that she had pleaded enough to survive the 
employer’s motion to dismiss.122 
Besides lifting, other major life activities claimed by pregnant plaintiffs can 
survive dismissal. For instance, in Nayak v. St. Vincent Hospital & Health Care 
Center, Inc.,123 the plaintiff successfully claimed the major life activity of 
working.124 And in Price v. UTI, U.S., Inc.,125 the plaintiff successfully pointed 
to limitations of her reproductive system to survive a motion to dismiss her ADA 
accommodation claim.126 In an education setting (rather than employment), a 
pregnant plaintiff successfully claimed that her pregnancy substantially limited 
her ability to learn and attend school.127 In Oliver v. Scranton Materials, Inc.,128 
 
 113. Id. at *9. 
 114. Bray, 2015 WL 1534515, at *9. 
 115. Id. at *11. 
 116. 17-CV-4825 (NGG) (JO), 2019 WL 2028701 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2019). 
 117. Id. at *4. See also LaSalle v. City of New York, No. 13 Civ. 5109(PAC), 2015 WL 
1442376, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2015) (25-pound lifting restriction was enough for the plaintiff 
to survive a motion to dismiss on her disability discrimination claim when the employer refused to 
accommodate her lifting restriction). 
 118. No. 3:15-CV-304, 2016 WL 1393393 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2016). 
 119. Id. at *2. 
 120. Id. at *3. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. No. 1:12–cv–0817–RLY–MJD, 2013 WL 121838 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013). 
 124. Id. at *2–3. 
 125. No. 4:11–CV–1428 CAS, 2013 WL 798014 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2013). 
 126. Id. at *3. 
 127. Khan v. Midwestern University, 147 F. Supp. 3d 718, 722 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 
 128. 3:14-CV-00549, 2016 WL 3397679 (M.D. Pa. June 13, 2016). 
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the plaintiff successfully claimed that the complications resulting from her 
pregnancy substantially limited her in sleeping and eating (she was on a liquid-
only diet).129 
c. Substantially Limits: Short-Term Issue 
One of the reasons pregnancy was denied protection prior to the ADAAA 
was because of the Supreme Court’s requirement that only impairments that 
were permanent or long-term were protected.130 But after the ADAAA, 
impairments that are short-term can still constitute disabilities if they are 
sufficiently severe. For instance, in Heatherly, discussed above, the employer 
tried to argue that the short-term nature of the plaintiff’s pregnancy restrictions 
precluded her pregnancy from being a disability.131 But the court disagreed, 
pointing to the regulations implementing the ADAAA, which state that an 
impairment that is short-term can still be substantially limiting.132 
Similarly, in Nayak,133 the court stated that a short-term impairment can be 
substantially limiting.134 Likewise, in Price v. UTI, U.S., Inc.,135 the plaintiff’s 
accommodation claim under the ADA survived, with the court holding that there 
was evidence that she was disabled given her multiple physiological disorders 
and conditions that affected her reproductive system, and that conditions no 
longer need to be long-term to be substantially limiting.136 And in Mayorga, 
discussed above, even though the plaintiff’s complications were only three 
weeks long, they were severe enough that the short-term nature did not preclude 
the plaintiff from surviving a motion to dismiss.137 
 
 129. Id. at *11 n.12. 
 130. Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). 
 131. Heatherly v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 132. Id. Relying on this case, another court held in an education, not employment, case that the 
short-term nature of the plaintiff’s pregnancy does not preclude it from being considered a 
disability. See Khan, 147 F.Supp.3d at 722–23. 
 133. Nayak v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., No. 1:12–cv–0817–RLY–MJD, 2013 WL 
121838 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013). 
 134. Id. at *3 (noting that complications that lasted most of her pregnancy and beyond were 
sufficient to establish a disability under the ADAAA). Interestingly, the court contrasted this case’s 
facts with another case, Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2011), stating 
that the pregnancy complications were longer-lasting in the case at hand, Nayak, 2013 WL 121838, 
at *3, but Serednyj is not a post-ADAAA case. Despite the fact that it was decided in 2011, the 
facts of the case (the pregnancy and termination) took place in 2007. Serednyj, 656 F.3d at 547. 
The ADAAA is not retroactive so courts only apply the expanded definition of disability when the 
facts of the case occurred after January 1, 2009, the effective date of the ADAAA. See ADA 
Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 3406 (2008). 
 135. No. 4:11–CV–1428 CAS, 2013 WL 798014 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2013). 
 136. Id. at *3. 
 137. Mayorga v. Alorica, Inc., No. 12–21578–CIV., 2012 WL 3043021, at *1, *6 (S.D. Fla. 
July 25, 2012). See also Oliver v. Scranton Materials, Inc., 3:14-CV-00549, 2016 WL 3397679, at 
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d. Disability Conceded 
In some cases, the defendant concedes the disability issue or the court just 
assumes that pregnancy is a disability.138 For instance, in Alexander v. Trilogy 
Health Services, LLC,139 the plaintiff was instructed not to work because of her 
high blood pressure after she learned she was pregnant in May 2010.140 The 
dispute in this case was whether the employer failed to provide her a leave of 
absence in order for her to stabilize her pregnancy-related high blood 
pressure.141 The defendant simply conceded that the plaintiff was disabled, 
although the plaintiff claimed hypertension as the impairment, rather than the 
pregnancy per se.142 The court held that the plaintiff was subject to suspension 
and termination when the defendant denied her a reasonable accommodation for 
her preeclampsia in violation of the ADA.143 
Similarly, in EEOC v. Absolut Facilities Management, LLC,144 the EEOC 
brought a class claim against the employer, alleging that the employer refused 
to offer any accommodations to pregnant women or individuals with disabilities, 
basically refusing to let anyone work with restrictions.145 The initial claim 
involved a pregnant woman who had a twenty pound lifting restriction and was 
forced by the employer to take leave instead of having her lifting restriction 
accommodated.146 The court approved a consent decree, issuing a permanent 
injunction against the employer’s failure to accommodate and also awarding 
back pay, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.147 
In Everett v. Grady Memorial Hospital Corp.,148 the plaintiff worked as a 
program manager for a car seat safety program at the hospital. Her job involved 
a great deal of standing, walking, bending, and occasional heavy lifting.149 When 
 
*11 (M.D. Pa. June 13, 2016) (noting that the short-term nature of pregnancy no longer matters in 
determining whether someone is disabled under the ADA). 
 138. See, e.g., Townsend v. Town of Brusly, 421 F. Supp. 3d at 355, 367 (M.D. La. Nov. 8, 
2019) (assuming that the plaintiff, who was a police officer when she became pregnant and required 
light duty work, was disabled under the ADA). 
 139. No. 1:11–cv–295, 2012 WL 5268701 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2012). 
 140. Id. at *2–3. 
 141. Id. at *11–12. 
 142. Id. at *11. 
 143. Id. at *12. 
 144. No. 1:18-CV-01020 EAW, 2018 WL 5258057 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018). 
 145. Id. at *1–2. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at *3. See also EEOC v. Tricore Reference Lab’ys, 849 F.3d 929, 938 (10th Cir. 2017) 
(in this discovery dispute, the defendant appeared to concede and the court assumed that the 
plaintiff’s restrictions because of her pregnancy constituted a disability; the question was whether 
the employer denied her an accommodation when it did not allow her to automatically transfer into 
a vacant position). 
 148. 703 F. App’x 938 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 149. Id. at 940–41. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
90 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 14:73 
she became pregnant, her pregnancy was high risk.150 Eventually, her doctor put 
her on bed rest and she requested to work from home, which the employer 
refused.151 The employer in this case conceded that she was disabled by her 
pregnancy and the only issue was whether a work-from-home accommodation 
would allow her to perform the functions of her job.152 
2. Pregnancy Is Not a Disability 
Some of the cases in which plaintiffs could not establish that their 
pregnancies were a disability appear to be the result of either poor lawyering 
(although one of the plaintiffs was pro se) or the court’s failure to recognize the 
broad post-ADAAA standards. A third reason some plaintiffs could not 
successfully pursue a claim under the ADA is because their restrictions (leading 
to their requested accommodations) were preemptive, rather than related to any 
complications caused by their pregnancies. This sub-part will address each of 
these three reasons in turn. 
a. Poor Lawyering 
In one example of what I believe was poor lawyering, the plaintiff’s 
pregnancy caused her doctor to restrict her lifting to no more than ten pounds.153 
The employer refused to accommodate her lifting restrictions.154 Because she 
ended up going on leave for the last five months of her pregnancy, the employer 
terminated her because she exceeded the twelve weeks of leave allowed under 
the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).155 Although the court recognized that 
pregnancy can sometimes be a disability, and that the plaintiff should have easily 
been able to demonstrate that she was substantially limited in the major life 
activity of lifting,156 the plaintiff argued that she was substantially limited in her 
ability to reproduce and carry her pregnancy to term.157 The court held she was 
not disabled.158 
 
 150. Id. at 940. 
 151. Id. at 941, 944. 
 152. Id. at 942. See also Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 883 F.3d 595, 
600, 603 (6th Cir. 2018) (defendant conceded that the pregnant plaintiff, who was an in-house 
attorney, was disabled when she was put on bed rest and requested to work from home). 
 153. Scheidt v. Floor Covering Assocs., Inc., No. 16-cv-5999, 2018 WL 4679582, at *2 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 28, 2018). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at *2–3. The facts appear quite egregious. They approved her to be on leave longer 
than the twelve weeks but then terminated her for exceeding it. Id. 
 156. See cases cited supra Part III.A.1.b. 
 157. Scheidt, 2018 WL 4679582, at *6. 
 158. Id. at *7. 
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In Sam-Sekur v. Whitemore Group, Ltd.,159 the plaintiff proceeded pro se.160 
Most of her medical issues occurred after she had returned from maternity 
leave.161 Her medical problems included a breast cancer scare, appendectomy, 
infection from an intrauterine device, an infected oral implant,162 some of which 
caused swelling, fevers, and something called “chronic cholecystitis.”163 The 
court held that all but the last of these conditions were too short-term to be 
substantially limiting.164 Fortunately, with respect to the chronic cholecystitis, 
the court gave the plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to explain how this 
condition was linked to her pregnancy.165 
In Love v. First Transit, Inc.,166 the plaintiff was a customer service 
representative who began bleeding while she was pregnant and subsequently 
miscarried.167 She was terminated because she did not present a doctor’s note 
after she miscarried.168 The court noted that the ADAAA has had only a modest 
impact when applied to pregnancy-related conditions.169 Pregnancy itself is not 
a disability even though pregnancy-related work restrictions might be a 
disability—conditions such as anemia, sciatica, carpal tunnel syndrome, 
gestational diabetes, depression, etc.170 The court stated: “Thus, where a medical 
condition arises out of a pregnancy and causes an impairment separate from the 
symptoms associated with a healthy pregnancy, or significantly intensifies the 
symptoms associated with a healthy pregnancy, such medical condition may fall 
within the ADA’s definition of a disability.”171 The plaintiff in this case tried to 
argue that her pregnancy substantially limited the major life activities of 
working, concentrating, and interacting with others.172 The court held that, given 
that the plaintiff was only off work for one day, she could not successfully argue 
 
 159. No. 11–cv–4938 (JFB)(GRB), 2012 WL 2244325 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2012). 
 160. Id. at *1. 
 161. Id. at *2. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at *6. 
 164. Sam-Sekur, 2012 WL 2244325, at *7. The court, however, cited to pre-ADAAA law 
regarding the short-term issue. Thus, this case could also fall under the category of “Court Errors.” 
 165. Id. at *9. Chronic cholecystitis is defined as a repeated and prolonged inflammation of the 
gallbladder. See Judi Marcin, Chronic Cholecystitis, HEALTHLINE (Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://www.healthline.com/health/chronic-cholecystitis. There does appear to be an increased risk 
of this condition with pregnant women, so perhaps the plaintiff would be able to successfully amend 
her complaint. However, it is unclear to me why the court needed to link this condition to her 
pregnancy rather than consider it a stand-alone disability. 
 166. No. 16-cv-2208, 2017 WL 1022191 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2017). 
 167. Id. at *1. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at *5. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Love, 2017 WL 1022191, at *5. 
 172. Id. at *6. 
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that any of her claimed major life activities were substantially limited.173 I 
consider this a case of poor lawyering because the plaintiff would have had 
better luck arguing that her major bodily function of reproduction was 
substantially limited.174  
b. Court Errors 
One very frustrating case was Abbott v. Elwood Staffing Services, Inc.,175 in 
which the pregnant plaintiff worked in a car manufacturing plant (through a 
staffing agency), when she started spotting after she strained to do her job.176 
Because of the spotting, her doctor put her on restrictions.177 In discussing the 
issue of whether the plaintiff’s pregnancy could be considered a disability, the 
court first noted that pregnancy, absent unusual circumstances, is not considered 
a disability.178 Although the court recognized that, under the ADAAA, a 
pregnancy-related impairment may be considered a disability if it substantially 
limits a major life activity, here, there was no evidence that the plaintiff’s 
pregnancy was not healthy or had complications.179 Even though the plaintiff 
argued that she was put on restrictions after straining at work and bleeding, the 
court stated that this does not mean there was anything wrong with her 
pregnancy.180 In an issue I am exploring elsewhere, the court also focused on 
the fact that the plaintiff did not specifically state she was disabled during her 
deposition. The court stated, “Finally, and tellingly in her deposition, the 
plaintiff stated that her condition ‘wasn’t a disability, it was pregnancy and on-
the-job injury, I wasn’t disabled. I was at all times physically able to work with 
requirements and restrictions.’ She never considered herself disabled . . . .”181 
In Selkow v. 7-Eleven, Inc.,182 the plaintiff worked in a 7-Eleven store when 
she became pregnant. She was supposed to scan the beer in the cooler but that 
involved lifting a lot of heavy items. She tried performing the task but it began 
hurting her back because of her pregnancy, so she asked a coworker to help, and 
he did.183 She told her supervisor that she needed help with heavy lifting and the 
supervisor agreed; she was never asked to lift heavy objects again.184 To be clear, 
 
 173. Id. 
 174. Williams, et al., supra note 13, at 116 (stating that any condition that, if left untreated, 
would result in a miscarriage, should be a disability under the theory that it substantially limits the 
major bodily function of reproduction). 
 175. 44 F. Supp. 3d 1125 (N.D. Ala. 2014). 
 176. Id. at 1159. 
 177. Id. at 1159. 
 178. Id. at 1165. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Abbott, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1138. 
 181. Id. at 1166. 
 182. No. 8:11–cv–456–T–33EAJ, 2012 WL 2054872 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2012). 
 183. Id. at *1. 
 184. Id. 
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this was not a failure-to-accommodate claim.185 However, she still claimed that 
her termination was discriminatory based on her pregnancy, which she alleged 
was a disability.186 Although the court held that she could not rebut the 
defendant’s legitimate reason for terminating her, namely an allegation that she 
had engaged in theft,187 the court nevertheless addressed the disability issue.188 
It held that her claim failed because her lifting restriction was not the result of a 
“severe” complication with her pregnancy.189 In doing so, however, the court 
did not cite to any post-ADAAA law or discuss the fact that lifting should be 
considered a major life activity.190  
c. Preemptive Accommodations 
One of the difficulties with using the ADA for accommodations related to 
pregnancy is if the accommodation requested is not needed for any 
complications arising from the pregnancy, but rather is simply a preemptive 
measure to avoid any harm to an otherwise healthy pregnancy. This usually 
occurs in situations where the work is inherently dangerous. For instance, in 
Brown v. Aria Health,191 the pregnant plaintiff was a nurse and requested a 
doctor’s note to exclude her from working in rooms where fluoroscopy (a type 
of x-ray) was used.192 Her supervisor said they would try to limit her contact but 
noted that in the past, other pregnant nurses had worked in those areas without 
issue.193 The employer also gave her the option of stepping out of the room 
and/or wearing a fetal monitoring badge, but the plaintiff did not accept any of 
these options.194 The plaintiff was also worried about areas of the hospital where 
bone cement was being used and obtained a doctor’s note precluding her from 
working in such areas.195 The plaintiff resigned because the hospital could not 
guarantee that it could comply with her restrictions.196 The court held that the 
plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim failed because her pregnancy was 
routine, meaning it was without any complications. Her desire to avoid some 
 
 185. Id. Instead, she was terminated after there was a shortage in her cash register and the 
surveillance tape looked like she had pocketed cash. Id. at *1–3. 
 186. Selkow, 2012 WL 2054872, at *3. 
 187. Id. at *10. 
 188. Id. at *11. Even though the court arguably reached the right result (because she cannot 
establish that the employer’s reason for terminating her was pretextual), it is still troubling when 
courts get the disability analysis wrong because later courts will rely on the faulty reasoning, 
thereby perpetuating the court’s error. 
 189. Id. at *14. 
 190. Id. 
 191. No. 17-1827, 2019 WL 1745653 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2019). 
 192. Id. at *2. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Brown, 2019 WL 1745653, at *3. 
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aspects of her job was not based on actual restrictions but rather an abundance 
(perhaps over-abundance?) of caution.197 
B. PDA Accommodation Claims Post-Young 
This sub-part will discuss the cases decided post-Young v. UPS that 
specifically address the pregnancy accommodation issue. There are obviously 
other PDA cases that only address discrimination issues (and not 
accommodation issues).198 I have not included those in this discussion. This part 
will first discuss the pregnancy accommodation cases that were successful 
(thirteen of them) and then the ones that were not (eleven of them).  
1. PDA Accommodation Claim Succeeds 
One of the relatively early post-Young cases has already received much 
attention.199 In Legg v. Ulster County,200 the plaintiff was a corrections officer 
at a county jail when she became pregnant after earlier pregnancy-related 
complications.201 Because of those complications, her doctor classified her 
pregnancy as high risk and recommended that she have no contact with inmates. 
After the employer initially denied the request, another lieutenant agreed to 
assign her to a light duty position if she was able to submit a note stating that 
she was free to work without restrictions.202 In order to avoid going on leave, 
she produced that note and was able to work light duty for a period of time.203 
However, before long, she was back to working with inmates again, and, while 
seven months pregnant, she was bumped as one of two fighting inmates ran past 
her.204 She left work and did not return until after she gave birth.205 
Her subsequent case went to trial, and the district court granted defendant’s 
motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of her case, holding that the 
employer’s policy of only allowing light duty for on-the-job injuries was 
 
 197. Id. at *5. Interestingly, however, the plaintiff’s PDA claim succeeded. Id. at *7. 
 198. See, e.g., Oliver v. Scranton Materials, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-00549, 2016 WL 3397679, at 
*2, *5 (M.D. Pa. June 13, 2016) (pregnancy discrimination claim survived in part because of 
comments made about her pregnancy (she was pregnant with triplets), which included, “You’re not 
going to be able to work with those three fucking babies at home.”); Mayer v. Prof’l Ambulance, 
LLC, 211 F. Supp. 3d 408, 411, 415 (D.R.I. 2016) (plaintiff who was terminated for wanting to 
pump breast milk after she returned from maternity leave had a valid PDA discrimination claim). 
 199. This is in part because it’s a Court of Appeals case (Second Circuit), whereas most of the 
cases are still at the District Court level. 
 200. 820 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 201. Id. at 70–71. 
 202. Id. at 71. It appears that the employer wanted to hide the fact that it was giving her light 
duty, for whatever reason. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Legg, 820 F.3d at 71. 
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pregnancy-neutral and therefore did not violate the PDA.206 During the 
pendency of the appeal, Young v. UPS was decided.207 Accordingly, using the 
prima facie case announced in Young,208 the court stated that she proved the 
prima facie case.209 She sought an accommodation while pregnant; the employer 
refused; and there were employees similar in their ability or inability to work 
who did receive accommodations, namely those injured on the job.210 For the 
employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason, it argued that New York 
Municipal law required them to pay corrections officers who are injured on the 
job (if they are not able to work), so the employer creates and reserves light-duty 
positions for those employees. The court held that this reason met the employer’s 
burden.211 
As is true with most discrimination cases, the plaintiff’s case turned on the 
issue of pretext with the court holding that the plaintiff had established sufficient 
evidence of pretext. The court pointed to two primary pieces of evidence that 
established pretext. First, the employer presented inconsistent justifications for 
not providing the plaintiff with light duty.212 One supervisor said that the 
employer wanted everyone to build up sick time and did not “believe in light 
duty” accommodations for those injured off the job.213 Another supervisor said 
that they refused her light duty in order to protect the safety of her unborn 
child.214 A third explanation was that it was more costly to provide light duty to 
pregnant employees.215 And finally, the employer claimed at the appellate stage 
that the policy was justified because they were complying with state law.216 
Second, the court held that the plaintiff could prove pretext using the 
analysis under Young.217 Similar to the Young case, the employer denied light 
duty to all pregnant employees.218 Although it was unclear whether the county 
accommodated a large percentage of non-pregnant employees in practice, they 
were at least eligible under the employer’s policy.219 Although the employer 
tried to argue that pregnant employees were not significantly burdened because 
 
 206. Id. at 71. 
 207. Id. at 72–73. 
 208. See supra Part II.C. 
 209. Legg, 820 F.3d at 74. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 74–75. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Legg, 820 F.3d at 75. This explanation makes no sense. Refusing her light duty but 
continuing to let her work (and insisting that she have contact with inmates) undoubtedly put her 
and her unborn child at more risk than if they had given her light duty work. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Legg, 820 F.3d at 76. 
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the plaintiff was the only employee who had been pregnant, the court disagreed 
with this analysis, stating, “[U]nder Young, the focus is on how many pregnant 
employees were denied accommodations in relation to the total number of 
pregnant employees, not how many were denied accommodations in relation to 
all employees, pregnant or not.”220 Thus, the court held that this fact 
demonstrated the significant burden on the plaintiff.221 
The employer also tried to argue that the plaintiff did not need an 
accommodation because she continued working after the employer promised her 
light duty and then took it away.222 The court responded that a policy that denies 
pregnant employees light duty and places them at risk of violent confrontations 
is a significant burden on pregnant employees under the Young analysis.223 In 
sum, the court held that the defendants’ reasons were not sufficiently strong to 
justify the burden on pregnant workers.224 And just because state law required 
accommodating on-the-job injuries did not mean that state law precluded the 
employer from providing those same accommodations to pregnant workers.225 
Finally, although the employer argued that cost was a factor in not providing 
light duty to pregnant workers, the court responded that cost cannot be 
considered under Young.226 
Although Legg is the only published appellate case,227 there are other district 
court cases where plaintiffs survived on the analysis under Young.228 For 
 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Legg, 820 F.3d at 77. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. The one other appellate published case is Hicks v. City of Tuscaloosa, 870 F.3d 1253 (11th 
Cir. 2017). This is an important case that held that lactation is a medical condition related to 
pregnancy and therefore protected by the PDA, and that plaintiff’s PDA claim survived using the 
analysis in Young. While the city was not required to provide Hicks with special accommodations 
for her lactation needs (which involved not wanting to be a patrol officer because the ballistic vest 
would interfere with lactation), because other employees were given alternative duties, she should 
have been as well. Id. at 1258–60. 
 228. To be clear, the plaintiffs survived motions for summary judgment or motions to dismiss 
in several other cases as well, but in the interest of space, I will only be discussing the cases with 
the most significant discussions of the accommodation analysis post-Young. Other cases where the 
plaintiff’s claim survived include: Allen-Brown v. District of Columbia, 174 F. Supp. 3d 463 
(D.D.C. 2016) (involving a police officer who requested accommodation to avoid having to wear 
a bullet-proof vest after her maternity leave because it interfered with her lactation; PDA 
accommodation claim succeeded); Borders v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 17-cv-0506-MJR-DGW, 
2018 WL 9645780, at *1–2, *6 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2018) (plaintiffs’ class action survived motion 
to dismiss because employer accommodated workplace injuries and disabilities but not pregnancy); 
Bray v. Town of Wake Forest, No. 5:14-CV-276-FL, 2015 WL 1534515, at *3, *6 (E.D. N.C. Apr. 
6, 2015) (plaintiff police officer’s PDA claim survived because she was refused light duty while 
two male officers received light duty and there is evidence to rebut the employer’s explanation that 
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instance, in Thomas v. Florida Parishes Juvenile Justice Commission,229 the 
plaintiff worked as a juvenile detention staff officer, which put her in contact 
with potentially violent detainees.230 She informed her employer of her 
pregnancy on April 1, 2016, and asked to have her bi-annual physical fitness test 
moved so that she could complete it earlier in her pregnancy.231 Her employer 
allowed her to complete four components of the test on the same day as her 
request, but said that the 1.5 mile run would take place as originally scheduled 
on April 21, 2016. She failed the run, and, because she was feeling ill after the 
run, she went to the emergency room where she was diagnosed with a placental 
bleed.232 She was on bed rest for two days and then told to be on light duty for 
two weeks; however, the employer refused, so she had to take personal leave for 
two weeks.233 She returned to work without restrictions, but when her run was 
rescheduled for June 6, her doctor wrote a note stating that she should avoid 
running and heavy lifting due to her high-risk pregnancy.234 In response to this 
note, the employer told her that she had to do the run and should not turn in the 
note.235 The employer explained that it would not excuse pregnant women from 
the 1.5 mile run even with a doctor’s note.236 Apparently, however, there were 
situations where it excused non-pregnant employees with physical limitations 
from the run.237 Relying on the advice of her boss, she attempted and failed the 
 
they reserved light duty only for on-the-job injuries); Brown v. Aria Health, No. 17-1827, 2019 
WL 1745653, at *7–8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2019) (allowing plaintiff’s PDA accommodation claim to 
go forward based on her request to avoid certain aspects of her job as a nurse that her doctor 
believed might pose a risk to her pregnancy; constructive discharge based on the employer’s failure 
to accommodate her); EEOC v. Absolut Facilities Management, LLC, No. 1:18-CV-01020 EAW, 
2018 WL 5258057, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018) (approving a consent decree issuing a 
permanent injunction against the employer’s discrimination of pregnant women and individuals 
with disabilities by refusing all accommodations); LaSalle v. City of New York, No. 13 Civ. 
5109(PAC), 2015 WL 1442376 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2015) (allowing plaintiff’s PDA claim to 
survive when her employer refused to accommodate her lifting restriction; although employer 
argued that the accommodation requested would not allow her to perform the essential functions of 
her job, the employer offered no explanation for why her requested accommodation was reasonable 
when she was pregnant in 2008 and yet they refused it in 2012); Martin v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 
132 F. Supp. 3d 794, 802–03, 822 (M.D. La. 2015) (plaintiff’s PDA claim survived after she was 
refused an accommodation to avoid lifting over ten pounds, forced on leave, and then terminated); 
McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817, 820–21, 829–30 (Iowa 2015) (paramedic for fire 
department was refused light duty while pregnant; state law claim relying on Young reversed 
summary judgment granted to employer). 
 229. No. 18-2921, 2019 WL 118011 (E.D. La. Jan. 7, 2019). 
 230. Id. at *1. 
 231. Id. at *2. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Thomas, 2019 WL 118011, at *2. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
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run on June 6, which led to severe pain and another trip to the emergency 
room.238 The doctor ordered light duty, which the employer initially refused and 
only granted when the plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim.239 The 
plaintiff worked in a light duty position until she was ordered on bed rest; she 
returned to work after the baby was born.240 
The plaintiff had brought claims under both the ADA and PDA but she only 
opposed the employer’s motion for summary judgment on the PDA claim.241 
Even though she was eventually accommodated, her PDA claim alleged that the 
employer violated the PDA for refusing to accommodate her pregnancy-related 
restriction on running by forcing her to complete the run test.242 The court first 
noted that she had direct evidence of discrimination because her supervisor said 
that the employer did not allow pregnant employees to be excused from the 1.5-
mile run, but it had allowed other employees to be excused from the run.243 The 
court also upheld her claim using the Young analysis.244 The employer tried to 
argue that she did not suffer an adverse employment action because she was not 
terminated or forced on leave.245 In response, the plaintiff argued that her 
injuries from having to perform the 1.5-mile run constituted an adverse 
employment action, as was the fact that her workers’ compensation claim 
resulted in a reduction in pay.246 But the court (correctly, in my opinion) held 
that an adverse employment action is not an element of the prima facie case 
when bringing a claim under the PDA for a failure to accommodate.247 This issue 
of whether an adverse employment action is a necessary element in a failure-to-
accommodate case has also arisen under the ADA,248 so I was happy to see the 
court in this case address it and come to the correct conclusion that an adverse 
employment action is not a necessary element of a failure-to-accommodate 
claim under the PDA. 
Another issue that is being debated by the courts post-Young is how similar 
the comparator must be under the fourth element of the prima facie case. This 
issue was addressed in Townsend v. Town of Brusly,249 in which the plaintiff was 
a police officer when she became pregnant in 2015.250 Her doctor advised light 
 
 238. Id. at *3. 
 239. Thomas, 2019 WL 118011, at *3. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at *4. 
 242. Id. at *5. 
 243. Id. at *6. 
 244. Thomas, 2019 WL 118011, at *7. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at *8. 
 248. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Adverse Employment Actions in Failure-to-Accommodate 
Cases: Much Ado About Nothing, 95 NYU L. REV. (ONLINE) 1, 5 (2020). 
 249. 421 F. Supp. 3d 352, 363 (M.D. La. 2019). 
 250. Id. at 355. 
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duty work for her, but the employer refused.251 She obtained a lawyer to help 
her navigate the negotiations for an accommodation with the employer.252 
During one of the meetings with the plaintiff, her lawyer, and the employer’s 
representatives, the Mayor stated that if the plaintiff wanted to keep her job, she 
should not remain pregnant.253 Towards the end of her pregnancy, the plaintiff 
was able to return to work full duty, and in a meeting between the plaintiff and 
the employer to discuss her return, the employer’s attorney advised the plaintiff 
that if she dropped her EEOC charge and lawsuit, they would consider 
reinstating her to her prior position.254 The Plaintiff declined to do so and was 
fired on the spot.255 Another complication for the plaintiff in this case was that 
a certification the plaintiff needed to perform her job as a police officer lapsed 
while she was pregnant.256 The employer tried to justify its termination of her 
by arguing that she was no longer qualified.257 
After a lengthy discussion of the facts and holding of Young,258 the court 
first found that there was direct evidence of discrimination—the employer’s 
statement that she should not stay pregnant if she wanted to keep her job, and 
the fact that the Chief of Police admitted that the employer never considered 
placing the plaintiff on light duty.259 The court then addressed the prima facie 
case under Young. The employer tried to argue that the plaintiff was not qualified 
because she could not carry a firearm due to her pregnancy, but the court stated 
that the qualified inquiry is not an element of a PDA claim post-Young.260 
Regarding the issue of a comparator (the fourth element of the prima facie 
case under Young), the employer focused on the different professional 
experience of the plaintiff’s chosen comparator, who was given light duty 
following eye surgeries.261 The court responded that determining a PDA 
comparator should not include an analysis of the difference in professional 
experience, disciplinary record, or available leave time.262 Instead, the sole basis 
for comparison is the similarity in the physical restrictions of the employees and 
the need for similar accommodations.263 Thus, both of the comparators that 
 
 251. Id. at 356. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Townsend, 421 F. Supp. 3d at 356. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 358–59. 
 259. Townsend, 421 F. Supp. 3d at 360. 
 260. Id. at 362–63. This is a debated issue, as will be discussed in Part IV. 
 261. Id. at 363. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
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plaintiff pointed to were valid comparators to meet the fourth element of the 
prima facie case.264 
The court assumed without discussion that the employer’s alleged legitimate 
non-discriminatory reasons were sufficient to meet its burden.265 These reasons 
included: (1) that the plaintiff was no longer qualified because of her restrictions 
and the fact that her certification had lapsed, and (2) that her position had been 
filled while she was on leave.266 Turning to pretext, the court first relied on the 
fact that the Chief of Police resented the plaintiff’s assertion of her legal rights 
and had stated that the defendant never even considered giving the plaintiff light 
duty work.267 In response to the defendant’s argument that state law does not 
require the employer to provide light duty to pregnant workers (as it does to 
workers injured on the job), the court stated that reliance on state law can still 
be pretextual if the reason for not also giving the pregnant employee the 
accommodation is because of cost concerns.268 As the Court noted in Young, the 
fact that accommodating pregnant workers would cost more is not a sufficient 
reason for refusing to do so.269 The court stated:  
The same could be said in the present case, particularly considering the complete 
failure to even consider accommodating Plaintiff while others with physical 
restrictions were accommodated, and in light of the comments made to Plaintiff 
that were hostile to her pregnancy or demonstrated a blanket refusal to 
accommodate her pregnancy. Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to summary 
judgment on Plaintiff’s PDA claim.270 
2. PDA Accommodation Claim Fails 
Of the eleven cases I identified where the PDA accommodation claim failed 
post-Young, several of them involved courts incorrectly applying the framework 
the Court announced in Young. Other claims that failed did so because the 
employer’s relatively small size meant that there were not any comparators. And 
some failed simply because of bad facts.271  
 
 264. Townsend, 421 F. Supp. 3d at 364. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 365. 
 269. Townsend, 421 F. Supp. 3d at 365. 
 270. Id. at 366. 
 271. See, e.g., Jones v. Brennan, No. 16–CV–0049–CVE–FHM, 2017 WL 5586373, at *6 
(N.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2017) (plaintiff loses her PDA accommodation claim because she actually 
was accommodated); Everett v. Grady Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 703 F. App’x 938, 948–49 (11th Cir. 
2017) (accommodation claim failed because accommodation requested of working from home was 
not reasonable). 
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a. Court Errors 
Courts appear to be struggling with how to apply the Supreme Court’s odd 
framework announced in Young. For instance, in Adduci v. Federal Express 
Corp.,272 the plaintiff’s job required her to be able to lift seventy-five pounds 
unassisted.273 When she informed her supervisor that she was pregnant and was 
on a twenty-five pound lifting restriction, the employer told her that she could 
not keep working, and that she was not eligible for “TRW (temporary return to 
work)” because she was a part-time employee.274 Therefore, she was put on 
unpaid leave.275 While on leave and still pregnant, they demanded she return 
with no restrictions, and when she could not, the employer terminated her.276 
The court analyzed the plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim277 using the 
McDonnell Douglas framework normally used for disparate treatment cases, 
rather than the prima facie case announced in Young for pregnancy 
accommodation cases.278 Thus, the court was applying the stricter comparator 
test, where the comparator must be similarly situated in all relevant respects.279 
Moreover, when the plaintiff pointed to the policy allowing part-time workers 
with a workplace injury to apply for light duty assignment, the court responded 
that the relevant inquiry is whether there actually was another employee who 
received more favorable benefits, not simply whether some hypothetical 
employee would be given more favorable benefits under the employer’s 
policy.280 This analysis makes it very difficult for pregnant plaintiffs to prove 
their cases. In other words, for this particular employer, the policy’s terms 
allowed full-time and part-time employees with workplace injuries to apply for 
light duty. It also allowed full-time employees with a non-workplace injury to 
apply for light duty. The only group that was excluded was part-time employees 
with a non-workplace injury. It seems likely that most such workers (part-time 
employees with a non-workplace injury) are going to be pregnant women, and 
yet the court never analyzed this plaintiff’s claim under the unique burden-
shifting framework announced in Young. 
 
 272. 298 F. Supp. 3d 1153 (W.D. Tenn. 2018). 
 273. Id. at 1155. Note that this is a very similar factual context to Young v. UPS. 
 274. Id. at 1156. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 1157. 
 277. She also brought a disparate impact claim. Adduci, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1159. Perhaps 
surprisingly, this claim survived. Id. at 1165. 
 278. Id. at 1159–60. 
 279. Id. at 1162. 
 280. Id. at 1163. 
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Similarly, in Chino v. Lifespace Communities, Inc.,281 a nursing assistant 
had a twenty-five pound lifting restriction, but the employer had a policy that 
every nursing assistant would be immediately removed if they had a lifting 
restriction.282 However, if the employee was injured on the job, the employer 
would try to place the employee on light duty where possible or practicable.283 
Otherwise, the employee would be terminated.284 Accordingly, when the 
plaintiff told her employer that she was pregnant, the supervisor responded: 
“You know what’s going to happen now . . . You’re going to have to take your 
12 weeks, then you’ll have your baby, we’ll terminate you, you’ll come back, 
re-apply and we’ll hire you back.” The plaintiff was also told that the employer 
doesn’t “make accommodations” and “you do the job that you’re hired for or 
you don’t work.”285 
The court cited to Young but arguably misinterpreted it. First, the court 
assumed without deciding that the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, 
but then stated that the plaintiff’s “claim fails because she cannot establish that 
[the employer’s] proffered reason for denying her light duty is a mere pretext for 
discrimination.”286 After discussing and dismissing plaintiff’s pretext arguments 
not related to the analysis in Young, the court then turned to a discussion of 
Young.287 The court stated the Young Court took no position on whether the 
policies in Young actually met the pretext standard, “a holding that suggests, 
without more, the existence of facially neutral policies that offer some workers 
better treatment than others does not establish discrimination . . . .”288 The court 
also stated that, because the plaintiff had not pointed to anything “outside of her 
own experience,” she had not proven that the employer’s policy imposed a 
significant burden on pregnant workers.289 The court appeared to be arguing 
that, because the plaintiff did not specifically point to other pregnant workers 
who were affected by the policy, the burden on pregnant women was not very 
great. However, given that nursing assistants are overwhelmingly women,290 it 
seems highly likely that other nursing assistants have been or would become 
pregnant and therefore would be affected by the employer’s policy. 
 
 281. 203 F. Supp. 3d 997 (D. Minn. 2016). This case was brought under a state statute, but one 
which is modeled after and appears to follow federal law for pregnancy discrimination claims. Id. 
at 1003. 
 282. Id. at 1000. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 1001. 
 285. Chino, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 1001. 
 286. Id. at 1005. 
 287. Id. at 1005–06. 
 288. Id. at 1006–07. 
 289. Id. at 1007. 
 290. Campbell Robertson & Robert Gebeloff, How Millions of Women Became the Most 
Essential Workers in America, INT’L N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020 
/04/18/us/coronavirus-women-essential-workers.html. 
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In a case that received some attention,291 Durham v. Rural/Metro Corp.,292 
the plaintiff, an EMT, told her employer that her doctor restricted her from lifting 
more than fifty pounds.293 Her boss told her that she would not be able to work 
as an EMT with the lifting restriction.294 She requested either light duty or a 
dispatch position.295 The employer refused both requests because its light duty 
policy only applied to employees who had a workplace injury, and they did not 
have a need for any more dispatch employees.296 Because she was not eligible 
for leave under the FMLA, the employer advised the plaintiff to apply for unpaid 
personal leave, but told her that if she did so, she would not be allowed to seek 
unemployment compensation, or to try to find another job.297 Accordingly, she 
declined to apply for such leave and then filed a charge with the EEOC and the 
instant lawsuit.298 
Although the court cited to Young, it did not utilize the prima facie case 
method used in Young; instead, it cited to the ordinary McDonnell Douglas 
framework, which does not mention accommodation at all.299 As the reader 
likely knows, the modified McDonnell Douglas framework generally requires 
the plaintiff to prove: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was 
qualified to do the job; (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; 
and (4) similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated 
differently.300 Interestingly, the court cited to Young301 when it listed the 
elements of the prima facie case, but ignored the fact that, nine pages later, the 
Supreme Court in Young announced a different prima facie case that should be 
used when the plaintiff is alleging a denial of an accommodation under the 
second clause of the PDA.302 As discussed above, the prima facie case in 
pregnancy accommodation cases requires: “that she belongs to the protected 
class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate 
her, and that the employer did accommodate others ‘similar in their ability or 
inability to work.’”303 
 
 291. See Robert Iafolla, 11th Cir. Mulls Pregnancy Bias in Light of High Court Ruling, 
BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com (search for “11th Cir. 
Mulls Pregnancy Bias in Light of High Court Ruling,” choose “Bloomberg Law News” under 
“Content Types”). 
 292. 4:16-CV-01604-ACA, 2018 WL 4896346 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 9, 2018). 
 293. Id. at *1. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at *2. 
 297. Durham, 2018 WL 4896346, at *2. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at *3. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 213 (2015). 
 302. Id. at 229. 
 303. Id. 
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Because the Durham court was applying the incorrect prima facie case, it 
detoured to a discussion of whether unpaid leave was an adverse employment 
action. Despite the fact that it seems obvious that an unpaid leave would be 
considered an adverse employment action, the court stated: “Given these 
disputes, the court cannot determine as a matter of law that Ms. Durham suffered 
an adverse employment action.”304 
Despite that conclusion, the court went on to discuss the comparator issue. 
First, the court stated that employees who were injured on the job were not 
relevant comparators.305 According to the court, the “PDA does not require an 
employer to provide special accommodations to its pregnant employees; instead, 
the PDA only ensures that pregnant employees are given the same opportunities 
and benefits as nonpregnant employees who are similarly limited in their ability 
to work.”306 The court’s discussion here only cited to pre-Young cases.307 The 
court also distinguished Young because the employer in the instant case only 
accommodated one “discrete group of employees, not several different types of 
disabilities where ‘many’ found accommodation by UPS.”308 It is true that UPS 
accommodated two other classes of employees besides those injured on the job 
(those with disabilities and those who lost their DOT certification), but that fact 
was ultimately relevant to the pretext discussion in Young, not the discussion of 
whether the fourth element of the prima facie case was met.309 And more 
importantly, the court in Durham ignored the fact that, even if the employer did 
not have an explicit policy of accommodating disabled workers, the ADA 
requires the employer to do so. Accordingly, the employer would be 
accommodating two groups of employees: those injured on the job and those 
who have a disability under the ADA. 
The court in Portillo v. IL Creations Inc.,310 made the same mistake as the 
Durham court. First, the accommodation requested in this case was very 
minor—the pregnant plaintiff asked to be allowed to remain seated while at the 
cash register—and the employer refused.311 The court skipped a discussion of 
the prima facie case, and instead addressed the employer’s non-discriminatory 
reason.312 The employer argued that it did not permit cashiers to sit while 
 
 304. Durham v. Rural/Metro Corp., 4:16-CV-01604-ACA, 2018 WL 4896346, at *3 (N.D. Ala. 
Oct. 9, 2018). The court appears to be stating the burden backwards. Given that the employer filed 
the motion for summary judgment, it is the employer’s burden to establish that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact with regard to any element of the plaintiff’s claim. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. at *4. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 229–30 (2015). 
 310. No. 17-1083 (RDM), 2019 WL 1440129 (D.D.C. March 31, 2019). 
 311. Id. at *5. 
 312. Id. at *6. 
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working the registers because it did not think this was an appropriate 
“appearance.”313 The plaintiff pointed to a comparator who was able to sit while 
working as a cashier, but the court (confusingly) stated that this fact does not 
answer the ultimate question of whether the employer intentionally 
discriminated.314 Although the court cited Young, it did not engage with the 
analysis in Young at all. The court seemed to be requiring a finding of animus, 
which is not a requirement of pretext under Young. Another problem exposed in 
this case is one I discuss more below: the employer is too small to have a 
sufficient number of comparators. I turn to that next.  
b. Too Few Comparators 
Several of the cases in which plaintiffs lost their PDA accommodation 
claims involved employers quite different from UPS, the employer in the Young 
case. UPS is a very large employer with several formal policies for the 
accommodation process.315 Many smaller employers do not have formal policies 
at all and might not have many employees seeking accommodations for any 
reason. Plaintiffs have struggled in these cases to survive the Young analysis. 
For instance, in Luke v. CPlace Forest Park SNF, L.L.C.,316 the plaintiff was 
a certified nursing assistant (CNA)317 who was pregnant with twins. Because of 
her pregnancy, she was put on a thirty-pound lifting restriction, but the employer 
refused to accommodate her lifting restriction, asserting that there was no light 
duty work available.318 When she could not return to work without restrictions 
because she was still pregnant, the employer fired her.319 The court did not 
engage in a detailed analysis under Young; instead, it stated that the plaintiff was 
not qualified to perform the job because the accommodation she requested 
would eliminate an essential function of the job, the ability to lift patients.320 
The plaintiff tried to present evidence that some workers were given 
accommodations that involved less lifting, but the court responded that in those 
situations one employee was simply receiving informal help from another 
employee, which is different from an employer-provided accommodation.321 
 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. 
 315. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 211–12 (2015). 
 316. 747 F. App’x 978 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 317. Three out of the next four cases discussed involve the health care industry, specifically 
CNAs. This is not surprising. As I have argued elsewhere, the realities of many healthcare jobs—
long hours, physical rigor, and sensitive safety issues—make it difficult for employers to find the 
right accommodation. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, The Difficult Accommodating Health Care 
Workers, 9 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 2–6 (2015). 
 318. Luke, 747 F. App’x at 978. 
 319. Id. at 979. 
 320. Id. at 979–80. 
 321. Id. at 980. 
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Because the plaintiff had not “pointed to any other CNAs that were 
accommodated when they had a similar medical restriction on heavy lifting, 
there is no evidence that would allow a jury to conclude that [the employer] is 
insincere when it says that such lifting is an essential part of the job.”322 Thus, 
unlike the Young case, where UPS had several different classes of employees 
who received light duty, this employer was apparently too small to have formal 
policies that provided light duty to certain groups of employees. Even 
informally, the employer apparently did not provide light duty or 
accommodations that would allow CNAs to avoid heavy lifting. 
Similarly, in Jackson v. J.R. Simplot Company,323 the plaintiff was an 
operator for a fertilizer plant, a job that required carrying heavy weights and 
exposure to chemicals and gases.324 The plaintiff was undergoing fertility 
treatment, and pursuant to her doctor’s advice, she requested two different 
accommodations—light duty to avoid heavy lifting and no chemical 
exposure.325 Even though she could point to comparators who were given light 
duty when they were unable to meet the lifting requirements of their jobs, none 
of those employees also had to avoid exposure to chemicals.326 Because of this 
lack of comparators, the court held that the plaintiff could not prove pretext.327 
The lack of a comparator also doomed the plaintiff in Salmon v. Applegate 
Homecare & Hospice, LLC.328 The plaintiff was a pregnant CNA with a lifting 
restriction.329 The employer told her they could not accommodate her because 
there were no light duty positions available; thus, she was terminated once her 
leave had expired and she could not return without the lifting restriction.330 The 
court held that the plaintiff’s PDA accommodation claim failed because the 
plaintiff could not prove that other CNAs were accommodated regardless of the 
availability of light duty work.331 In other words, because the employer was not 
large enough to always reserve light duty work for those who have restrictions, 
the plaintiff could not use a CNA who had been given light duty when it was 
available as a comparator. 
Finally, in Turner v. Hartford Nursing and Rehab,332 another CNA became 
pregnant, and, because of a previous miscarriage, her pregnancy was high risk 
 
 322. Id. 
 323. 666 F. App’x 739 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 324. Id. at 740. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. at 743. 
 327. Id. at 742–43. 
 328. No. 1:13-cv-00109-DN, 2016 WL 389987, at *10 (D. Utah Feb. 1, 2016). 
 329. Id. at *2. 
 330. Id. at *3. 
 331. Id. at *10. 
 332. No. 16-cv-12926, 2017 WL 3149143 (E.D. Mich. July 25, 2017). 
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so she was restricted from lifting more than ten pounds.333 The employer refused 
to accommodate her lifting restriction, stating that it reserved light duty only for 
those who are injured on the job.334 Because the plaintiff had not been employed 
long enough to be entitled to a leave of absence, the employer terminated her.335 
The plaintiff tried to point to evidence that the employer allowed non-pregnant 
workers who were injured on the job to get light duty, but because the plaintiff 
could not actually identify any such employees who were given light duty for 
any reason, her claim failed.336 
Keep in mind that in all of these cases, it is likely that if the employer was 
larger, the plaintiff would be able to point to comparators. It is the small size of 
the employer that doomed the plaintiffs’ claims. The claims also failed because 
the courts were looking for actual comparators, not simply hypothetical 
comparators—individuals who would have been accommodated if they had 
requested an accommodation.  
IV.  LESSONS LEARNED—WHERE TO GO FROM HERE 
This Part will identify the gaps in protection between the two different 
statutes. I will then provide some advice for plaintiffs and their lawyers when 
trying to bring a pregnancy accommodation claim under either the ADA or PDA.  
A. The Gaps in Protection 
Generally speaking, plaintiffs’ lawyers who are representing pregnant 
employees who were denied337 accommodations should bring a claim under both 
the ADA and the PDA, if at all possible. Some scholars have argued that the 
ADA claim is often the more straightforward claim to bring. 338 I tend to agree 
with that. This subpart will discuss problems plaintiffs have when bringing both 
types of claims.  
1. When the ADA Will Not Work 
ADA coverage will fail in cases where the pregnant employee is not 
currently experiencing any complications from the pregnancy, but works in a 
 
 333. Id. at *1. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. at *2. 
 336. Id. at *6. 
 337. If possible, it would certainly be better for a pregnant woman to get a lawyer’s help 
obtaining accommodations before she is denied a needed accommodation that would lead to her 
termination. And in an ideal world, employers would be routinely providing these accommodations 
and we would not need to resort to litigation. It certainly is possible that this is already happening 
on a large scale and we simply don’t have the data to know that. 
 338. Zehrt, supra note 24, at 709. 
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position where her doctor is recommending preemptive accommodations.339 
This happened in a couple of the cases in my dataset. First, in Brown v. Aria 
Health,340 the plaintiff was a pregnant nurse who asked to be excluded from 
rooms where a certain type of x-ray was used and rooms where bone cement was 
used.341 Although the employer tried to accommodate her in various ways, she 
eventually resigned. Her disability claim failed because her pregnancy was 
routine and without complications.342 
In a similar case, Jackson v. J.R. Simplot Company,343 the plaintiff was an 
operator for a fertilizer plant, a job which required exposure to various chemicals 
and gases. When she began fertility treatment, her doctor advised her to avoid 
the exposure to chemicals.344 She would not have been able to prove that she 
had a disability; accordingly, she relied on a claim under the PDA.345 
An ADA accommodation claim is also unlikely to be successful in a few 
other situations (even if the plaintiff can establish the coverage question—that 
complications with her pregnancy constitute a disability under the ADA). Those 
situations are if the plaintiff’s restrictions are such that there would not be a 
reasonable accommodation that would allow her to perform the essential 
functions of her job.346 For instance, if a pregnant woman works alone in a 
position that requires heavy lifting, there might not be an accommodation 
possible that would allow her to comply with a lifting restriction.347 As another 
example, if an employee needs to be on bed rest, and her job is not amenable to 
working from home, the court is likely to hold that her ADA claim fails because 
there is not a reasonable accommodation that would allow her to perform the 
essential functions of the job.348 
Finally, an ADA claim is not likely to be successful when the plaintiff is 
asking the employer to create a new position. Courts generally hold that a request 
for “light duty” work is a request to create a new position. And even when 
 
 339. Williams et al., supra note 13, at 136 (describing situations where the ADA won’t work, 
such as a police officer who “wants to be taken off the beat and given desk work for fear that she 
might be hit hard in the womb during a scuffle,” or an employee who wants to avoid toxins in the 
workplace). 
 340. No. 17-1827, 2019 WL 1745653 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2019). 
 341. Id. at *2–3. 
 342. Id. at *5. 
 343. 666 F. App’x 739 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 344. Id. at 740. 
 345. Id. at 741. 
 346. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining qualified individual as someone who can perform the 
essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation). 
 347. See, e.g., Chino v. Lifespace Cmtys, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1000 (D. Minn. 2016). 
 348. See, e.g., Everett v. Grady Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 703 F. App’x 938, 945–46 (11th Cir. 2017) 
(working from home is not a reasonable accommodation when the job as a program manager 
required her to teach classes in person, among other tasks that could not be done at home). 
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employers have such positions, they often reserve them for those employees with 
workplace injuries.349 The ADA has not disrupted this norm.  
2. When the PDA Has Not Worked 
As noted above, the main problem with bringing a PDA case is the lack of 
comparators if the employer is small. If smaller employers have never given a 
particular accommodation, they will argue that there are no comparators.350 
Advice for getting around this problem is discussed below.  
B. Advice for Litigants 
1. Pleading Disability 
Despite the fact that we are more than ten years out from the ADAAA, courts 
and litigants are still making errors when pleading the disability coverage issue 
under the ADA.351 In order to argue that pregnancy is a disability, plaintiffs’ 
lawyers should: 
• Explain the complications caused by the pregnancy.352 
• If lifting is restricted, make sure to plead that the impairment caused by 
the pregnancy substantially limits the major life activity of lifting.353 
• If the pregnant employee’s doctor has issued restrictions because of fear 
of miscarriage (especially in cases where there have been prior 
miscarriages), the plaintiff should also plead that she is substantially 
limited in the major bodily function of reproduction (which is a major life 
activity).354 
 
 349. See, e.g., Abbott v. Elwood Staffing Servs., Inc., 44 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1159 (N.D. Ala. 
2014). 
 350. See Widiss, supra note 25, at 1439 (discussing concern about plaintiffs who work for small 
employers who may not have had an employee who needed an accommodation pursuant to the 
ADA); Williams et al., supra note 13, at 120; Zehrt, supra note 24, at 707–08 (The Court points 
out that the UPS policy was an extreme example and suggests that the employer’s refusal to 
accommodate a pregnant worker must be more than an isolated event. If only a couple of people 
are affected, it seems like it will be difficult to meet the pretext element explained in Young.); Pisko, 
supra note 5, at 152 (Young will not help if employers do not provide accommodations to any of 
their workers). 
 351. See generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, Explaining “Not Disabled” Cases Ten Years After 
the ADAAA: A Story of Ignorance, Incompetence, and Possibly Animus, 26 GEO. J. ON POVERTY 
L. & POL’Y 383 (2019). 
 352. Pregnant women still have to work around the default assumption that a perfectly “normal” 
pregnancy is not an impairment. But complications associated with the pregnancy can constitute a 
disability, so it’s important to point to the complications. 
 353. Not only is lifting a major life activity under the ADAAA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) 
(defining major life activities to include lifting), most of the successful cases discussed above were 
able to point to a substantial limitation on lifting. 
 354. Id. § 12102(2)(B). See also Williams et al., supra note 13, at 116. 
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• Mention the demise of the duration requirement; short-term impairments 
can still be considered disabilities.355 
Finally, litigants should cite to cases and other sources mentioned in this paper 
to support the arguments made here.  
2. Claims Under the PDA 
As courts struggle to deal with the still relatively new pregnancy 
accommodation doctrine post-Young, they are continuing to make mistakes of 
which litigants need to be aware so they can hopefully steer the courts in the 
right direction. First, remember that the modified prima facie case that the Court 
announced in Young requires the plaintiff to prove that: (1) she belongs to the 
protected class; (2) she sought accommodation; (3) the employer did not 
accommodate her; and (4) the employer did accommodate others “similar in 
their ability or inability to work.”356 
Some courts have required elements that are not part of the prima facie case 
in Young. For instance, several courts required the plaintiff to prove she was 
“qualified,”357 using the heightened standard of “qualified” under the ADA, 
even though proving “qualified” is not technically an element announced in 
Young.358 Litigants should be prepared to counter this argument. 
The other element that courts sometimes impute into the Young prima facie 
case is a requirement to prove an “adverse employment action.”359 As noted 
above, this is not an element of the prima facie case announced in Young. But 
employers will often try to argue that a denial of an accommodation is not always 
an adverse employment action. For instance, in Thomas v. Florida Parishes 
 
 355. Williams et al., supra note 13, at 135. 
 356. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 229 (2015). 
 357. See, e.g., Everett v. Grady Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 703 F. App’x 938, 948–49 (11th Cir. 2017) 
(stating that the plaintiff is not qualified even with an accommodation, because the accommodation, 
working from home, would eliminate essential functions of the job); Luke v. CPlace Forest Park 
SNF, L.L.C., 747 F. App’x 978, 979–80 (5th Cir. 2019) (stating that the plaintiff is not qualified, 
because if the employer complied with her lifting restriction, she would be unable to perform the 
essential functions of the job as a CNA). 
 358. See Widiss, supra note 25, at 1143 (stating that Young does not require proof of 
qualifications at the prima facie case stage). See also Townsend v. Town of Brusly, 421 F. Supp. 
3d 352, 362–63 (M.D. La. 2019) (noting that qualified is not a necessary element of the prima facie 
case). 
 359. See, e.g., Allred v. Home Depot USA, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00483-BLW, 2019 WL 2745731, 
at *13 (D. Idaho June 28, 2019) (stating that, even though the Young Court does not explicitly 
require an adverse employment action as part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the plaintiff 
nevertheless has to prove that she suffered an adverse employment action); Brown v. Aria Health, 
No. 17-1827, 2019 WL 1745653, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2019) (not using the Young prima facie 
case, court required an adverse employment action, but argued that plaintiff can establish one 
because the employer refused to let her follow her doctor’s restrictions); Durham v. Rural/Metro 
Corp., 4:16-cv-01604-ACA, 2018 WL 4896346, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 9, 2018) (requiring an 
adverse employment action). 
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Juvenile Justice Commission,360 the employer required the plaintiff to attempt a 
1.5 mile test run despite her doctor’s orders that she should not run (in part 
because she had already attempted the run once while pregnant and ended up in 
the hospital with a placental bleed).361 The employer tried to argue that the 
plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action because she was not 
terminated or forced on leave.362 In response, the plaintiff argued that her 
injuries from having to perform the 1.5 mile run constituted an adverse 
employment action, along with the fact that her workers’ compensation claim 
resulted in a reduction in pay.363 But the court (correctly, in my opinion) held 
that an adverse employment action is not an element of the prima facie case 
when bringing a claim under the PDA for a failure to accommodate.364 Pregnant 
plaintiffs and their attorneys need to be ready to steer the court in the right 
direction by citing to cases and other authorities that explain that there is not a 
requirement under Young to prove an adverse employment action. 
The other problem with PDA claims (as discussed above) is demonstrating 
that there is a comparator when the employer is small.365 Smaller employers are 
unlikely to have official policies (like UPS did in the Young case). They are also 
less likely to have many (if any) employees who had the same restrictions as the 
pregnant employee’s restrictions. Thus, this makes it difficult to point to a 
comparator. However, plaintiffs should be prepared to argue that, because of the 
expanded definition of disability under the ADA, the employer would be 
required to provide an accommodation if one of its employees had a disability 
with limitations similar to the pregnant plaintiff’s. This still might not win the 
day, because the Young pretext analysis is stated in terms of percentages—
plaintiff can prove pretext by “providing evidence that the employer 
accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to 
accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers.”366 But it allows plaintiffs 
to get closer to establishing the necessary comparator.  
3. Dealing with the Light Duty Problem 
One of the most pressing problems in these cases (under both the ADA and 
PDA) is the light duty problem. Although Young dealt with an employer who 
offered light duty to three classes of employees—those with workplace injuries, 
those with disabilities under the ADA, and those who had lost their DOT 
certification367—most employers only offer light duty to employees who have 
 
 360. No. 18-2921, 2019 WL 118011 (E.D. La. Jan. 7, 2019). 
 361. Id. at *2. 
 362. Id. at *7. 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. at *7–8. 
 365. See cases cited supra Part III.B.2.b. 
 366. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 229 (2015). 
 367. Id. at 211–12. 
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workplace injuries.368 Courts routinely hold that it does not violate the ADA for 
an employer to reserve those light duty jobs for employees with workplace 
injuries.369 In other words, even if an employer has such a light duty position 
available, it does not have to give it to a disabled employee as a reasonable 
accommodation. Furthermore, some courts will characterize a request for light 
duty as a request to create a new position, and creating a new position is never a 
reasonable accommodation under the ADA.370 
This fact also creates a problem for PDA claims. If a pregnant employee is 
asking for a light duty accommodation, and the employer only gives light duty 
to employees with workplace injuries, the plaintiff will have difficulty 
establishing pretext under the test announced in Young371 because there will 
likely not be a large percentage of employees that the employer does 
accommodate. Importantly, pregnant employees will not be able to point to 
disabled employees as comparators in most situations because most employers 
(unlike UPS) do not give light duty to disabled employees (unless their 
disabilities were caused by a workplace injury). 
How can we solve this problem? One simple (albeit perhaps incomplete) 
answer—employees and their medical professionals should avoid asking for 
“light duty” using those words. “Light duty” is a catch-all term for other job-
related restrictions. Pregnant plaintiffs would be better off asking for the specific 
accommodations they need. Often, light duty means a restriction on lifting. Ask 
to be excused from heavy lifting. Sometimes, light duty also means that the 
employee needs frequent breaks (if the job is physically rigorous). If that is the 
case, the pregnant plaintiff (and her doctor) should ask for more frequent breaks. 
In other words, instead of the doctor writing a note that describes the pregnancy-
related complications and advises “light duty,” the doctor should instead write 
something like this: “employee is advised not to lift more than twenty pounds 
and should have a five-minute, sit-down break every hour.” It is still possible 
that the employer might argue that the accommodations would eliminate an 
essential function of the job (and therefore the plaintiff is not qualified) or that 
there is not a comparator that has received such an accommodation. But avoiding 
 
 368. The reason for this is workers’ compensation laws, which require employers to pay for 
leaves of absence for employees who cannot work because of a workplace injury. Accordingly, 
given the choice between paying an employee to stay home and do nothing, versus paying an 
employee to do “light duty” work, most employers will set aside a few “light duty” positions so 
they can avoid having to pay employees injured on the job to stay at home and collect a paycheck. 
See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the ADA, 47 GA. L. REV. 527, 577 (2013). 
 369. See id. at 577–78 (discussing this issue). 
 370. See, e.g., Turner v. Hershey Chocolate USA, 440 F.3d 604, 614 (3d Cir. 2006); Hoskins 
v. Oakland Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 227 F.3d 719, 729 (6th Cir. 2000); Fedro v. Reno, 21 F.3d 1391, 
1396 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 371. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 229 (2015). 
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the phrase “light duty” should assist the pregnant plaintiff and her lawyer in 
arriving at a reasonable accommodation that would work for everyone.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Five years after the Supreme Court’s opinion in Young v. UPS, and eleven 
years after the ADAAA went into effect, pregnant plaintiffs are still struggling 
to get the simple accommodations they need to continue working through their 
pregnancies. Although the legal landscape has improved for pregnancy 
accommodations, there remains work to be done. On the ADA side, we need 
courts to understand the breadth of the ADA, and to stop instinctively excluding 
pregnancy from the class of individuals who are protected by the ADA. 
As for the PDA, I imagine the Supreme Court might have to step in at some 
point in the future to clear up some of the confusion caused by the Young case. 
Issues that will need resolution include: (1) whether the plaintiff has to prove 
she is qualified;372 (2) whether the plaintiff has to prove she suffered an adverse 
employment action;373 and (3) whether hypothetical comparators count—i.e., if 
the employer would have to accommodate an employee with a disability that has 
the same restrictions as the pregnant plaintiff, would the pregnant plaintiff be 
able to use that hypothetical comparator? This last issue is probably the most 
important, because it will affect a plaintiff’s ability to receive accommodations 
when she works for a smaller employer. As we know from the FMLA context, 
it is often lower-income women who work for smaller employers and smaller 
employers tend to provide less generous benefits.374 Allowing these women to 
continue to work instead of being forced on unpaid leave or being terminated is 
vitally important. 
One legal issue that would affect claims brought under both statutes is 
whether an employer should be able to reserve its light duty jobs for employees 
with workplace injuries. This privileging of workplace injuries makes sense 
because of worker’s compensation mandates but is troubling in the 
accommodation context. Because I do not expect a fix to this problem any time 
soon, I believe plaintiffs would be well-advised to quit asking for light duty as 
an accommodation, and instead, ask for the specific restrictions their doctors are 
advising. 
 
 372. My answer to this question, simply based on the prima facie case analysis in Young, is 
“no,” the plaintiff does not have to prove she is qualified as part of her prima facie case. However, 
it is still possible that the employer’s defense (its legitimate non-discriminatory reason) will be that 
the plaintiff is not qualified because any accommodation would eliminate essential functions of the 
job. 
 373. Again, my answer to this is “no”—as I’ve argued in the ADA context as well, the failure 
to accommodate substitutes for the adverse employment action. See generally Porter, supra note 
249, at 1. 
 374. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Finding a Fix for the FMLA: A New Perspective, A New 
Solution, 31 HOFSTRA LABOR & EMP. L.J. 327, 339–40 (2014). 
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Finally, one issue this Article does not tackle is whether these protected-
class accommodation mandates (under the ADA and PDA) are the best way to 
address pregnant women’s needs for accommodations in the workplace. As I375 
(and others)376 have argued elsewhere, perhaps universal accommodation 
mandates would better serve the needs of pregnant women without creating what 
I refer to as “special treatment stigma.”377 In the interest of space constraints, 
that is a topic better left for another day. 
 
 
 375. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Accommodating Everyone, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 85, 108 
(2016). 
 376. See, e.g., Areheart, supra note 52, at 1168–69 (advocating for a universal accommodation 
mandate). 
 377. See Porter supra note 375, at 108–10. See also Nicole Buonocore Porter, Special 
Treatment Stigma After the ADA Amendments Act, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 213, 233–38 (2016) 
(describing special treatment stigma). 
